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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ALBERT P. NEILSON and EILEEN
W. NEILSON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

Case No.
7306

ISADORE EISEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the defendant, Isadore Eisen,
from a judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Utah, dated December 10, 1948, in favor of the
plaintiffs and against defendant, Isadore Eisen, in the
sum of $8,500.00, with interest at the Tate of eight per
cent per annum from April1, 1947, $500.00 attorney fees,
and costs. A judgment of no cause of action was rendered
in favor of the defendant, Freda Eisen, and 'as neither
of the parties have appealed therefrom, she is not concerned and is not a party in this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The co1nplaint of the :plaintiffs was in two counts.
In their first count, the plaintiffs in substance alleged
that on December 7, 1946, the plaintiffs entered into a
\\~ritten agreement \vherein the defendants, Isadore
Eisen and Freda Eisen, agreed to pay plaintiffs the sum
of $8,500.00 on or before April 1, 1947; that on April 1,
1947, the plaintiffs had fully performed ev-ery covenant
required by them to be performed in said agreement and
defendants failed and refused to pay the said sum of
$8,500.00.
Attached to and by reference incorporated in the
complaint was a copy of the written agreement. There
· were, however, two agreements attached to the plaintiffs'
complaint. The first was a uniform real estate contract,
dated the·---~-----------day of December, 1946, by and between
the plaintiffs, as Seller, and the defendant, Isadore Eisen,
as Buyer, wherein the latter agreed to buy from pJaintiffs
certain real !property located in Salt Lake County, Utah,
described as Lot 23, Block 2, Colonial Hills, for the sum
of $22,000.00, payable as follows: $7;000.00 cash, $'6,500.00
on or before January 10, 1947, and $8,500.00 on or before
Aprill, 1947. This agreement, according to the copy attached to plaintiffs' complaint, was signed by plaintiffs,
a.s ·Seller, and defendants, Isadore Eisen and Freda
Eisen, as Buyers. The second agreement attached to
plaintiffs' complaint was dated December 7, 1946, executed by and between plaintiffs, as first parties, and
the defendant, Freda Eisen, as second party, wherein
the parties refer to the uniform real estate contract and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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designate the real property therein sold as being a residence located at 1887 Harrison Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and "~hich 'vas not entirely completed, and requiring the p·laintiffs to complete the construction of certain
items before requiring defendant, Freda Eisen, to make
the final 'payment of $8,500.00 due, under the ter~s of
the uniform real estate contract, on Ap·ril 1, 1947.
At this time we call the Court's attention to the fact
that the defendant, Isadore Eisen, was not a party to the
uniform real estate contract, but the defendant, Freda
Eisen, \Yas the only person designated as Buyer and she
signed the contract as such (Exhibit 4). The situation
,,·as the same with respect to the second agreement (Exhibit 5).
In the second count of their complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that defendants were indebted to them in the
sum of $300.00, for materials, labor and contracting
services. However, they failed to furnish a Bili of Particulars upon order of the Court and did not introduce any
evidence at the trial in support of their allegations and
this count was dismissed.
To this complaint, the ·defendants made answer,
denying that the defendant, Isadore Eisen, executed the
agreements attached to plaintiff's complaint and alleged
that same were executed by the defendant, Freda Eisen,
\vithout the knowledge or consent of the defendant, Isadore Eisen; and averred further that on or about the
lOth day of August, 1946, the defendant, Isadore Eisen,
agreed in writing to purchase the premises described in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiffs' complaint for $22,000.00, the plaintiffs agreeing, among other things, to erect thereon a double brick
garage with overhead doors; that thereafter, 1plaintiffs
erected a wooden garage over the objections of defendant; Isadore Eisen, and did not build the house on said
premises in accordance with said agreement, by reason
of which the defendant, Isadore Eisen, was damaged in
the sum of $2,392.08; that defendant, Isadore Eisen, had
paid plaintiffs $13,500.00, and ·was entitled to credit of
said sum of $2,392.08, and offered to pay ;plaintiffs
$6,107.92 upon plaintiffs executing and delivering him
a good and sufficient warranty deed of said premises.
The case came on for trial on November 30, 1948, and
the evidence established that the defendant, Isadore
Eisen, was a widower who had lost his eyesight and became totally blind the forepart of 1946, and the defendant,
Freda Eisen, was his daughter; that W. D. Scott, a real
estate broker negotiated with them for the sale of a residence under construction at 1887 Harrison Avenue. A
series of conferences resulted in the execution of an
ernest money receipt and agreement together with a
list of specifications (Exhibits 1 and A). Thereafter,
this agreement was ·canceled hy mutual -consent and another ernest money receipt was executed on August 10,
1946 (Exhibit 2), This agreement was signed by B. D.
Scott, Seller, and Isadore Eisen, Purchaser. Mr. Scott
contended that at this time the -specifications were
changed, eliminating a double-brick garage with overhead doors, and instead, a double frame garage with overhead doors was substituted (Exhibit C). On the other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hand, Isadore Eisen testified that the specifieations (Exhibit ...-\.) \Yere removed from Exhibit 1 and attached to
the agreement executed on ~\ugust 10, 1946 (Exhibit 2).
A \Yood garage "~as erected on the premises, notwithstanding the objections and protest of the defendant,
Isadore Eisen (Exhibit ·9). Isadore Eisen was in L·os
Angeles, California, during the month of December, 1946,
for an operation on his .eyes, and in his absence, defendant Freda Eisen executed the agreements attached to
plaintiffs' complaint (Exhibits 4 and 5). These documents, according to defendant, Isadore Eisen, were executed without his authority; that he first learned about
them in February, 1948; that he took possession of the
premises and made payments to the plaintiffs on the
basis of the agreement dated August 10, 1946, (Exhibit 2); that upon his return from California in January,
1947, he \Vas assured by the plaintiff, Albert P. Neilson,
that the wood garage would be removed and a brick
garage built in its place (R. 167). The plaintiffs failed
to erect a brick garage with overhead doors and failed
to complete the house in other respects and Mr. Eisen
refused to pay the balance .of the il'urchase price until an
adjustment was made. The evidence established that
there was a decrease of $500.00 in value of the premises
constructed with a wood garage instead of a brick garage
(R. 123-124). That it would cost $1,150.00 to remove the

\Yood garage and erect a brick garage in its place (R.126).
It ,,. .as further established beyond dispute that the premises at the time suit was filed had been mortgaged by
the plaintiffs to the First Federal Savings and Loan
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Association in the
n1ortgage was due
default at the date
dered (R. 106 and

sun1 of $8,500.00; that the note and
and payable and plain~iff.s were in
of trial and when judgment was ren110-111).

Judgment was entered against the defendant, Isadore Eisen, for $8,500.00 and $500.00 attorney fees, and
in favor of the defendant, Freda Eisen, of no cause of
action (R. 31-32).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The appellant assigns as error the following orders
and rulings of the trial Court:
1. The Court erred in overruling the demurrer of the
d efendan t to plaintiffs' complaint.
2. The Court erred in making Finding of Fact No.
6, (R. 27).
3. The Court erred in making Finding of Fact No.
7, (R. 27).
4. The Court erred in making Finding of Fact No.
9, (R. 27)
5. The Court erred in making its Conclusion of Law
No. 1, ( R. 28).
6. The Court erred in making its Conclusion of Law
No. 2, ( R. 28) .
7. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendant, Isadore Eisen.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
The plaintiffs must allege and prove a tend·er of a deed
and abstract of title before they can maintain an action for
the balance of the purchase price under the real estate
contract. (Assignments of error numbers 1, 4, and 7 are
involved in the discussion of this point.)
The appellant in advancing this argument is assuming, but not admitting, that he "\Vas a party to the uniform
real estate contract. The })rovision in the contract in
which we are concerned provided as follows:
''The Seller ~on receiving the payment herein
reserved to be paid at the times 1and in the manner
above mentioned agrees to execute and deliver to
the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as
may have accrued by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense,
an abstract or policy of title insurance, at the
option of the Seller, brought to date at time of
·sale or -at time of delivery of deed at the option
of Buyer."
The authorities are almost unanimous in holding a
vendor, under such a provision, must allege and 1prove
tender of a deed and abstract before he can require the
vendee to pay the balance of th.e purchase; that these
are mutual, dependent covenants; and that the vendee
does not have to make full payment and then speculate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as to his chances of securing a proper deed of conveyance
and an abstract of title.
The rule is well stated and a case frequently cited
is Boone vs. Tentpleman, et al., (Calif.) 110 P. 947, where
the Court said:
''Where in a contract f·or the s·ale of land
the price is made payable in installments at different times and the deed is to be made when the
whole is paid, the vendor may, upon failure to
pay any intermediate installment, forthwith sue
for its recovery. But, if he allows the whole to
become due, the payment of the price then becomes a dependent and concurrent condition. Nonipayment alone does not put the vendee in default.
The vendor must tender -a deed as a condition to
demanding payment of the price, and he cannot,
without such tender, ~declare a forfeiture, or maintain a suit either for the whole price, or for an intermediate installment.'' (Citing eases.)
In a more recent California case, Casper Lumber Co.
vs. StowBll, 98 P. 2nd 744, the plaintiff sued to recover
the balance due upon ·a written contract for the sale of
real property. 'The -complaint did not allege the rights
of the vendee had been forfeited or that a tender of a
conveyance was made but did :p~lead that plaintiff was
willing and able to 1perform all of its obligations under
the contract. The defendant interposed a general and
special demurrer, both of which were sustained without
leave to amend from which this appeal \vas taken. In
affirming the judgment, the Court stated:
''By his failure ;to allege a tender of performance by the seller the pleader has rendered his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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00mplain t den1urrable. The necessity of such (t
ten·der is not a matter of eontroYP1'8Y in this
state.'' (The court thereupon re-affirms the rule
established in Boone Ys. Templernan, Supra.).
The Court further stated:
''In case of breach by the Yendee, the vendor
may bring suit (1) for the instalments which are
due~ (2) for damages for the breach; (3) for
specific performance; (4) to foreclose ; or ( 5) to
quiet title. The first two actions are at law, the
last three in equity. A general offer to do equity,
or a plea of readiness and willingness will excuse
a plea of tender in a bill of equity. 26 RCL p. 626.
This is on ithe p~rinciple that a court of equity once
acquiring jurisdiction of the cause will assume
full jurisdiction in order to do eomplete equity.
But there is no such rule in resvect to a pure action at law such as ""\Ve have here. In such case,
1vhere the obligation of the vendor is to convey
upon payment of the full purchase price, the two
conditions are dependent and concurrent. No
other rule is possible. Paragraph IV of the contract of ·sale gives the vendor the option in case
of any default 'Of vendee, to claim the entire
balance due, or to claim the rights of the vendee
forfeited. The complaint pleads that the vendor
elected to claim the entire purchase price, and
the written notice to the vendee pleaded as an ex·hibit is to that effect. No forfeiture was attempted and none pleaded. The rights of the parties
are plain - if the vendor recovers the full 1purchase price, the vendee is entitled to a conveyance
.of the property. We are not impressed with appellant's suggestion thrut resp·ondent might not satisfy the judgment, and hence no tender would be
necessary, or that respondent might sue to quiet
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title or sue in equity to co1npel appellant to execute a deed. The principle of the ruling cases
is that where under a contract for the sale of real
property calling for the payment of the !purchase
price in instalments, with an acceleration clause
in the event of nonpayment ·of any instalment,
the vendor exercises the acceleration option and
declares the whole amount due, the parties are in
the same position as when the final payments become due by the lapse of time fixed in the contract.
As ahove noted, the appellant herein did not claim
a default or forfeiture, but demanded payment in
full. Such a demand ~annot put the vendee in
default without a tender ·of a deed. Lemle v.
Barry, 181 Cal. 6, 10, 183 P. 148."
To the same effect is Dubois vs. Andrews, (Okla.)
152 P. 440. The plaintiff here, as vendor, commenced

this action against the def.endant, as purchaser, of certain
real estate for the balance of the purchase money thereof evidenced by a series of promissory notes, all of which
wer.e past due. The contract stipulated that when the
purchase price had been paid, the plaintiff would execute
a deed for the real estate to the purchaser. The complaint did not alleg.e that the ~plaintiff had executed a
deed to the 1purchaser, or had tendered a deed, or had
offered to deliver the same upon the payment of the balance of the purchase money. The defendant filed a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint upon the .grounds
that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled and upon
trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. The
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Supreme Court reversed the judgment upon the ground
that the trial court erred in oYerruling the demurrer and
stated:
"'The la'v seems to be "\vell settled that, \vhere
a note or a series ·of notes is given for the purchase price of land and the contract of sale stipulated that if the note or notes are 1paid at maturity, the payee will convey the land to the
maker. The payment of the balance .of the purchase price and the execution of ~the conveyance
are mutual and ~dependent convenants, and the
execution of the conveyance or the offer to do so
is essectial before an action can be maintained
upon such note or notes.''
A case in which the entire complaint is set out and
\vhich in all respects is similar to the allegations of plaintiff's complaint is Will-0-Way Development Co. vs. Mills,
(Ohio), 171 N.E. 94, 171 N.E. 360. The

p~laintiff

here

brought· an action for the unpaid balance due under the
terms of a real estate contract. It alleged that it had
performed all the terms and conditions on its part to be
performed, and was ready, willing, and able to ·comply
with said contract at all times. Defendant interposed a
general demurrer upon the grounds that the complaint
did not state a cause of action. The Demurrer was sustained and plaintiff appealed. In affirming the judgment,
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals ruled that
plaintiff must plead and :p,rove a tender of a deed to prevail in an action for the balance of the purchas·e vrice.
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Plaintiff urged that it did not have to do a vain thing
by making a tender 'vhen the vendee notified it of her refusal to go forward with the contract. In this connection,
the court said :
.''That would be ·SO, so far as the right to
recover damages wa:s concerned, but, as already
pointed out, this is not that sort of an action. It
is to get the purchase price, and therefore a tender
is necessary and is not a vain or useless thing. We
think the defendant is entitled to have a tender
made of the deed before she is called upon to pay
the money, :and we think thart the petition, not
~stating this, does not state a cause of action.''
And in B·t. John vs. Richard, (Mich.), 262 N. W. 437,
the court stated:
"It is well ·settled in this state that before
one may sue on a land eontract to recover the
balance of the unpaid purchase price, he must
tender a deed of the premises contracted to be
sold.''
Also, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Heights

Land ~co . vs. Swengel's Estate, 179 A. 431, set -out the
rule as follows:
''An action to compel payment of the purchase money cannot be maintained by the vendor
without tender of a conveyance before suit
brought. (Citing eases.) With this requirement
plaintiff did not comp1ly. The statement of claim
does not .aver tender of a deed; all that it sets
forth is the veiled ·averment that 'the plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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has al\Yays been and still is ready, willing, and
able to perform its agreement.' This 'vas not sufficient to sustain this action; the bare averment
of readiness and "~illingness to perform cannot
erect by construction into an averment of tender
of full performance.''
The Idaho Supren1e Court In Walsh, et ux. vs.

Coghlan et al., 190 P. 252, states the general rule at page
~53:

"The record discloses that all the unpaid installments of purchase price were due ·at the time
the action was commenced. There£ore, in order
to be in position to demand a forfeiture of appellants' interest, or to ·w. aive it and recover judgment for the purchase price, it was necessary for
respondents to allege and prove they tendered a
deed eonveying the 1prop~e:rrty to the purchasers,
together with an abstract showing title -as mentioned in the con tract.''
See also, Stevens et ux. vs. Irwin, et ux, (Wash.),
231 P. 783.

W ernes vs. Z entsmaster, 61 Fed. 2nd, 298.
Plaintiffs should not he permitted to prevail without proving the tender of a deed and an abstract showing
good title. To do so, may require the appellant to perfect
the title by a suit to quite title. This, under the terms
of the contract, is the plaintiffs' obligation and not the
appellant's.
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POINT 2
Upon encumbrance of land by mortguge, vendor must
tender title subject to mortgage and cannot maintain an
action for balance of purchase price. (Assignment of Error
number 7.)

In addition to the provision mentioned in Point 1,
the uniform real estate eontract contained the following
prOVISIOn:
''The 'Seller is hereby given the option to
execute and maintain a loan secured by mortgage
upon said property of not 1to exceed ~,500.00,
bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed 5 per
cent. When the principal has been reduced to the
amount of the loan and mortgage, the Seller
agrees to convey and Buyer agrees to accept title
to the above deseribed property, subject to said
loan and mortgage.''
The plaintiffs, in following the terms of the contract, elected to encumber the pro!perty with a mortgage
in the amount of $8,500.00, an amount which represents
or which is equal to the unpaid portion of the purchase
price for which plaintiffs are now seeking recovery. W·e
have ealled attention in Point 1 to the f.act that the paragraph relating to the manner in which title was to be
conveyed in ·event of the payment of the full purchase
price by the Buyer contemplated that the Seller execute
and deliver to the Buyer or assigns a good and sufficient
warranty deed conveying the title to the premises involved, free and clear of all encumbrances. It should be
noted that this general provision relating to the manner
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of con11pletion of the contract contained a major exception, "€xcept as herein n1entioned a:nd except as ·may
have accrued by or through the acts or neglect of the
Buyer". This exception lmdoubtedly relates to the manner of conveyance that must be follo-\ved under the terms
of the contract if the Seller exercised the option to encumber the prop·erty permitted by the above quoted
paragraph of the contract. Accordingly, \Ye urge that
the vendor, once having encumbered the land, may not
sue for the balance of the purchas-e price but must convey title subject to the mortgage.
In the case of Glassman vs. Condon, 27 Utah 463,
76 P. 343, plaintiff entered into a contract to sell property
to the defendant. The property at the time was subject
to a $1,000.00 mortgage. The contract, after providing
for :payments and the re-duction of such mortgage, then
provided:
'' ... leaving a balance of $250.00 for which
the party of the second part assumes and agrees
to pay $250.00 of a mortgage of $1,000.00 now existing and covering on the above described land
with other lands .
. ''The party of the first .p,art agrees to make
to the party of the second part a warranty deed
upon the payment of $275.00 on October 1, 1902,
subject to a mortgage of $250.00 which party of
the second part assumes and agrees to pay.''
Plaintiff tendered the warranty deed and demanded the
$275.00. Defendant refused to accept and refused to
make further payments on the ground that the $1,000.00
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
mortgage remained unpaid. The Supreme Court of Utah,
in holding for the defendant, states:
"It is an elementary principle of law that
every purchaser of real property has a right to
demand a title free from encumbrances and defects ....
' 'A purchaser in every s-ale, unless he specifically stipulates to the contrary, has a right to
expect that he will acquire a valid and unassailable
title, and the law assumes that he !purchases with
that object in view."
·Similarly in our case the Buyer entered into a contract contemplating a receipt of title under one of two
situations; either one clear of all encumbrances, as provided in the latter part of the contract, or one subject
to an encumbrance not to exceed the sum of $8,500.00.
The Buyer, once the land became subject to encumbrance,
was entitled to r·eceive a tender of a deed forthwith, subject to encumbrance, and was not required to take the
risk that upon payment of the balance of the purchase
price, such encumbrance would be discharged by the
vendor and a marketable title delivered.
When a contract involving real property containing option similar to the above quoted option, it must
be strictly construed, and other portions of the contract
must be ·construed, in the light of such option. In Cousins
vs. Melvin F. Lampha.r & ·Co., (Mich.), 20 NW 2nd, 783, it
was held that a provision in a land contract authorizing
the vendor to encumber lands by mortgage, to secure
not more than the balance owing thereon at the time of
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mortgage, and a provision authorizing the vendor to
convert a land eontract into a mortgage whenever purchaser should ag·ree to accept a deed in fulfillment of the
land contract, and execute a mortgage for the unpaid
balance owing on the contract, were to be construed together in light of ·all of the terms of the original land
contract.

In our immediate case, the vendor has encumbered
the land and at the same moment seeks to recover the
unpaid amount of the purchase price. By such process,
the ve-ndor not only fails to leave himself in a position
whereby he can deliver a good and marketable title
but thrusts upon the vendee the risk that the mortgagee
will not release the mortgage at some subsequent date.
This situation was considered in the case of Hinckley vs.
Snzith, 51 NY 21. In th·at case the existence of a mortgage
against the property was held to relieve the vendee of
the duty of performing on his part. It was .pointed out
that to impose this duty on the vendee, the mortgagees
ought to have been vresent, with releases duly executed
and prepared to be delivered, or such documents as would
render the premises free of encumbrance ought to have
been entrusted to some person, who would be present
when the offer was made, having authority to deliver or
record them upon receiving the mortgage which the vendee had agreed to execute in substitution thereof. The
court said:
"There was no certainty that she (the vendee) would have been able to ;obtain a title to
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gages, if she had accepted the deed from plaintiff
and delivered her bond and mortgage according to
the contract. The hazar·d of the mortgagees continuing to be of the same mind, and willing torelease the tavern stand upon the ·Security of her
1nortgage, would have been changed from the vendor to the purchaser without any reasonable indemnity. . . . Mrs. Smith had not agreed, and
cannot be required to accept such a risk.''
The plaintiffs have placed the defendant in a position
where he may have to pay $8,500.00 twice, once pursuant
to the judgment entered herein, and the other to the
company holding the mortgage. The law, as set forth by
the cases cited in this brief, is to the effect that the vendor must deliver title to the vendee free and clear of all
encumbrances unless it appears in the contract that the
parties intended delivery of the premises subject to an
encumbrance. In the contract sued upon in this case,
the vendors had the 01ption of mortgaging the property,
'\vhich from the evidence appears that they did so to
the extent of $8,500.00, being the balance due under the
contract. It was therefore the duty of the vendors to
tender a deed subject to the mortgage. They cannot bring
an action for what is owing on the mortgage. In other
words, the vendors have no cause of action against the
vendee for the reason that there is nothing due them.
Vendors had only one duty to perform and that was to
deliver a deed subject to the mortgage. Buahanan vs.
Alw·ell, (Tenn.) 8 Humph. 518, 50 ALR 204; 55 Am. Jur.
p·aragraph 515 (Vendor and Purchaser), 55 Am. Jur.
916 (Vendor and Purchaser), paragraph 522; 57 ALR
1379.
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POINT 3
Where a writing is required for authorization of an
act on the part of an agent, it must be affirmed by the principal in writing in order to constitute ratification. (Assignments of Error No. 2, 3, 5, 6.)

In America-n Lau· Inst-itHte, Resta.te1nent of Law on
.A.gency, paragrruph 93, it is stated:

"Where formalities are requisite for authorization of an act. It affirmance must be by the
same formalities in order to constitute a ratification.''
Section 33-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides
as follows:
''No estate or interest in real property, other~
than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property ·or in any manner relating thereto, shall
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared otherwise than by act or ·operation of law,
or by deed or :eonveyance in writing subscribed
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized by writing.''
In 2 Am. Jur., Section 215, page 172, the rule relative to ratification is stated as follows:
''A ratification of an ·act done by one assuming to be an agent relates back and is equivalent
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to a prior authority. When, therefore, the adop.
tion of any particular form or mode is necessary
to confer the authority in the first instance, there
can be no valid ratification except in the same
manner. But since for most 1purposes no particular mode or form is necessary to confer an authority, it may be said generally that no particular
form of ratification is ordinarily necessary. In
most instances, ratification may be established by
p~arol, and even by implication from the conduct
of the purported principal manifesting that he
·consents to be a party to the transaction or from
conduct justifiable only if there is ·a ratification.
If, however, the act is one which requires a written
authorization, the ratification of an unauthorized
act must also be in writing. Thus, where the statute requires the authority of an agent to sell
lands to be in writing, an oral approval of an un·
authorized ~sale or a sale upon different terms
than those upon which the authority was originally made, is unavailing. Also, where power to
execute an instrument under seal must be conferred by an instrument of equal solemnity, the
ratification of the unauthorized act of the agent in
executing the sealed instrument is required to be
under seal; a parol ratification by the principal
is insufficient. ''
In 2

~C.J.S ..

paragraph 46, page 1091, it is stated:

"In the absence of some element of equitable
estop1pel where the original authority to an agent
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tion of the act done w·ithout authority must also
be in writing.''
To the same effect, see :2 C.J. parag'raph 106, page
487, 'vherein the rule is stated as follo·w·s:
"Where the original authority to an agent
to execute an act must be in \Vriting, the ratification of the act done \vithout authority must, ...
be in writing.''
Under our Statute of Frauds cited above, an agent
to ID'ake a contract affecting realty must be authorized by
a principal in writing before he can make a valid contract. If the agent, without written authority, makes a
contract, it can be ratified by the principal in writing.
Parol or oral approval is not sufficient to constitute rati:fication under such circumstances. In this case, Freda
Eisen, the daughter of the appellant, did not have any
authorization in writing from her father to execute the
uniform real estate contract, upon whieh the plaintiff's
action is p~redicated.
The Court made findings that Isadore Eisen authorized his daughter to act for and on behalf of him in
the execution of the agreements for the purchase of the
house and that Isadore Eisen knew of and consented
to the authorized acts of his daughter. These findings are
bas-ed solely upon inferences from defendant's acts.
Nowhere in the record is there any written approval on
the 1part of Isadore Eisen of the purchase made by his
daughter of the property in question. The lack of written
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tention and the Court's judgment that the acts of Freda
Eisen were ratified and therefore the execution of the
contract by her was the act of her father.
In Norton VB •. Overholtzor, et al, (California) 218
P. 637, real property was listed with a real estate broker
for sale under a written listing, and the broker made
a. contract of sale in the name of the owner, believing
he had such authority under his listing, it was held
that without written ratification on the part of the owner,
the contract made by the agent was not enforcible.
Under similar circumstances a like holding w·as
made in the case of Rosenweig vs. Akers, et al, (Ariz.)
245 P. 278.
The record clearly discloses that Isadore Eisen at
all times believed that all payments ·made on the house
were on the preliminary agreement between himself and
B. D. Scott. There is no oral or written evidence that
he ever ratified the contract between the plaintiffs. and
his daughter. The ~plaintiffs dealt directly with Freda
Eisen. They were not concerned about Isadore Eisen
as the Purchaser. Mr. Neilson, on direct examination
testified:
'' Q : Did you have any concern over or particular interest in who signed ·as the buyer~
"A: No, I didn't." l(R. 99).

CONCLUSION
The judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the appellant should be reversed. The evidence failed
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to establish that appellant 'vas a 1party to the real estate
contract. If, however, the court should determine otherwise, the judgment should not be permitted to stand hecause plaintiffs did not and could not produce and tender
a marketable title. Havin,g encumbered the property
with a mortgage in a sum equal to the balance of the
purchase price, plaintiffs "'"ere thereafter precluded from
brincing an action for the balance of the purchase price.
They should have tendered appellant a deed subject to
the mortgage and an abstract indicating that sueh mortgage was the only defect in the title.
In any view of the case, on reason, logic and judicial
precedent, plaintiffs' judgment against appellant should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

H. G. METOS
SAMUEL BERNSTEIN
Attorneys f'Or Defendant and
Appellant, Isadore Eisen
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